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Abstract
This paper reviews the standard techniques of efficiency measurement, discusses some of the
issues that arise in applying these standard techniques to central banks, and reviews some of the literature
that has attempted to apply these techniques to central banking.  The uniqueness of some of the activities
of central banking, the difficulty in measuring some of the central banking outputs, and the complicated
and multiple objectives pursued by central banks makes application of the standard techniques
problematic.  However, certain central bank activities do lend themselves to efficiency measurement, e.g.,
payment services provision.
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1. Introduction
This paper discusses some of the issues that arise in applying the standard methods of efficiency
measurement to central banks.  There is a long literature of the application of such methods to financial
institutions, in particular, to commercial banks (see Berger and Mester, 1997, and Berger and Humphrey,
1997 for discussions of the literature).  Berger and Humphrey (1997) documented 130 studies of financial
institution efficiency, using data from 21 countries, from multiple time periods, and from various types of
institutions, including banks, bank branches, savings and loans, credit unions, and insurance companies.
These papers fall into the broader literature that attempts to measure the performance of financial
institutions.  This substantial body of work suggests that progress has been made on this front.  Much less
progress has been made in explaining the differences in performance (i.e., profitability or efficiency)
across institutions.  The sources of such differences remain illusive: a study by Berger and Mester (1997)
of U.S. banks in 1990-95 found 25 variables explained only about 7 percent of the variance of measured
cost efficiency and about 35 percent of the variance of measured profit efficiency.
Many fewer papers have applied efficiency measurement to certain aspects of central banking,
most particularly the payment services produced by the U.S. Federal Reserve System, including check
processing and currency distribution (examples include Bauer and Hancock, 1993; Bauer and Ferrier,
1996; Bohn, Hancock, and Bauer, 2001; and Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson, 2002).  Only a handful of
papers have attempted to apply standard efficiency methods to the study of monetary policymaking.  In2
order to understand the issues that arise in applying efficiency measurement techniques to central
banking, I will briefly review some concepts of efficiency and the methods used in measuring efficiency.
I'll then discuss applications of these methods to central banking.
2. Definition of Efficiency
Efficiency measurement is one aspect of firm performance.  Efficiency is measured with respect
to an objective; it can be measured with respect to maximization of output, maximization of profits, or
minimization of costs.  Duality theory can be used to derive the cost function from the production
function, and cost is a component of profit; hence, the three concepts are not independent.  Scale
economies, scope economies, and X-efficiency are different aspects of performance.  Scale and scope
economies refer to selecting the appropriate outputs, while X-efficiency refers to selecting the appropriate
inputs.  Typically, scale economies refer to how the firm's scale of operations (its size) is related to cost 
i.e., what percentage increase in costs occurs with a 1-percent increase in scale.  A firm is operating at
constant returns to scale if, for a given mix of products, a proportionate increase in all its outputs would
increase its costs by the same proportion; a firm is operating with scale economies if a proportionate
increase in scale leads to a less than proportionate increase in cost; a firm is operating with scale
diseconomies if a proportionate increase in scale leads to a more than proportionate increase in cost.
Scope economies refer to how the firm's choice of multiple product lines is related to cost.  A firm
producing multiple products enjoys scope economies if it is less costly to produce those products together
than it would be to separate production into specialized firms.
1  X-efficiency measures how productive the
firm is in its use of inputs to create output.  If all firms in an industry are producing the scale and
combination of outputs that minimize the average cost of production, then the total cost of producing the
industry's output is minimized, and the industry is producing the efficient combination and level of
products, provided each firm is using its inputs efficiently.  Firms that exhibit X-inefficiency are either
wasting some of their inputs (technical inefficiency), or are using the wrong combination of inputs to3
produce outputs (allocative inefficiency), or both.  Management ability (or lack thereof) may be a source
of X-inefficiency, but managerial preferences might be another source, to the extent that managers can
pursue objectives that differ from those of stockholders.  For example, managers might derive utility from
having large staffs or other perquisites, as well as high profits, so that U=U(π,E), where π is profits and E
is expenditure on labor (or other input).  Some studies of commercial banks and savings and loans have
found evidence of such “expense-preference” behavior; others found evidence of “empire building,” i.e.,
pursuit of inefficient mergers to gain larger scale and presumably prestige (see Edwards, 1977; Mester,
1989a, 1989b, 1991; and Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, and Pagano, 2003).  In the following discussion, I
will focus on measures of X-efficiency, rather than scale and scope economies.
In commercial banking in the U.S., many studies have found large X-inefficiencies, on the order
of 20 percent or more of total banking industry costs, and about half of the industry's potential profits.
The estimates often vary substantially across studies according to the data source, as well as the efficiency
concepts and measurement methods used in the studies.
As a general definition, efficiency is a measure of the deviation between actual performance and
desired performance.  Thus, efficiency must be measured relative to an objective function.  Much of the
literature focuses on simple objective functions, like output maximization, cost minimization, or profit
maximization, but other studies acknowledge the fact that the objectives of firm management may differ
from these and try to incorporate this into efficiency measurement, or focus on more market-based
definitions of efficiency, e.g., operation on a risk-return frontier (see Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon,
2000, and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001).
 A fundamental decision in measuring financial institution efficiency is which concept to use, and
the choice will depend on the question being asked.  The concept chosen should be related to economic
optimization in reaction to market prices and competition, rather than being based solely on the use of
technology.  We can ask the question, is the firm maximizing the amount of output it produces given its
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 Note that I've defined both of these concepts relative to the costs of production, but they could just as well have
been defined relative to the profitability of production. That is, what effect does an increase in scale or scope have4
inputs or minimizing the amount of inputs it uses to produce a given level of output  i.e., is it operating
on its production frontier  but that is a question about technological optimization.  This is less
interesting from an economic perspective, since it ignores values.  It cannot account for allocative
inefficiency in misresponding to relative prices in choosing inputs and outputs, and it is difficult to
compare firms that tend to specialize in different inputs or outputs, because there is no way to compare
one input or output with another without the benefit of relative prices.  There is also no way to determine
whether the output being produced is optimal without value information on the outputs.
Instead, we would like to investigate questions of economic optimization.  For example, is the
firm minimizing its costs of production given its choice of inputs, taking input prices as given; is the firm
maximizing its profits given its choice of inputs and outputs, taking input and output prices as given.  A
firm might be operating on its production frontier (i.e., not wasting resources), and so be technically
efficient, but could still be allocatively inefficient if it is choosing the wrong mix of inputs given the
relative prices of those inputs.  Similarly, the firm could be technically and allocatively efficient in
producing its chosen level of output, but choosing the wrong level of output in order to maximize profits.
Figure 1 shows a simple two input, one output case of firm production.   The figure shows an
isoquant  the combinations of input x1 and x2 (say labor and capital) it takes to make output level y0.
Firm B is technically efficient, since it is operating on the isoquant.  Firm A is inefficient, since it is
operating interior to the isoquant.  That is, Firm A is using more of inputs x1 and x2 to produce y0.  But
note that Firm B could do better as well.  Firm B could lower its costs of producing y0 by using a different
combination of the inputs, given their prices w1 and w2.  Namely, Firm B would minimize its cost of
producing y0 by operating at point O  given the prices of the inputs, Firm B should use more x1 and less
of x2.   Since we want to capture such allocative inefficiency, we'll want to focus on the economic
concepts of cost-minimization and profit-maximization, which are based on economic optimization in
reaction to market prices and competition, rather than based solely on the use of technology.
                                                                                                                                                                          
on profit?5
2.1 Cost Efficiency. Cost efficiency gives a measure of how close a firm’s cost is to what a best-
practice firm’s cost would be for producing the same output bundle under the same conditions.  It is
derived from a cost function in which variable costs depend on the prices of variable inputs, the quantities
of variable outputs and any fixed inputs or outputs, environmental factors, and random error, as well as
efficiency.  Such a cost function is often written in logarithmic form:
ln Ci = ln f(yi, wi, zi, hi) + ui + vi,( 1 )
where C measures variable costs, w is the vector of prices of variable inputs, y is the vector of quantities
of variable outputs, z indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs (inputs or outputs, like physical plant,
which cannot be changed quickly), h is a set of environmental or market variables that may affect
performance (e.g., regulatory restrictions), ui denotes an inefficiency factor that may raise costs above the
best-practice level, and vi denotes the random error that incorporates measurement error and luck that
may temporarily give firms high or low costs.  The inefficiency factor ui incorporates both allocative
inefficiencies from failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs, w, and technical inefficiencies
from employing too much of the inputs to produce y.
The function f denotes some functional form and represents the best-practice frontier.  The term,
ui + vi, is treated as a composite error term: vi is a two-sided error, since random measurement error or
luck can be positive or negative, and ui is a one-sided (positive) error, since inefficiency means higher
costs.  The various X-efficiency measurement techniques use different methods to identify the
inefficiency term, ui, as distinct from the random error term, vi.
The cost inefficiency of any Firm i would be measured relative to the best-practice frontier.  Note
that the best-practice frontier refers to the best practice observed in the industry and not true minimum
cost, which is not observable.  Conceptually, the cost inefficiency of Firm i measures the percentage
increase in cost of Firm i, adjusted for random error, relative to the estimated cost needed to produce Firm
i’s output vector if the firm were as efficient as the best-practice firm in the sample facing the same6
exogenous variables (w,y,z,v).
2  It can be thought of as the proportion of costs or resources that are used
inefficiently or wasted.  Figure 2 shows an example.  The estimated cost frontier is given by f.  Firm j is
fully efficient.  Its actual cost lies below the frontier due to random error.  Firm i is inefficient.  The
difference in bank i's cost and the frontier value at the same y is due to both random error and
inefficiency.
2.2 Standard Profit Efficiency.  Cost minimization is not the only goal of the firm.  The firm
should minimize the cost of producing a given output bundle, but that output bundle should be chosen to
maximize profits.  Standard profit efficiency measures how close a firm is to producing the maximum
possible profit given a particular level of input prices and output prices (and fixed netputs and
environmental variables).  In contrast to the cost function, the standard profit function specifies variable
profits in place of variable costs and takes variable output prices as given, rather than holding all output
quantities statistically fixed at their observed, possibly inefficient, levels.  That is, the dependent variable
in the profit function allows for consideration of revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as
inputs.  Output prices are taken as exogenous, allowing for inefficiencies in the choice of outputs when
responding to these prices or to any other arguments of the profit function.
The standard profit function, in log form, is:
ln (π+θ)i = ln g(pi, wi, zi, hi) − uπi + vπi, (2)
where π is the variable profits of the firm; θ is a constant added to every firm’s profit so that the natural
log is taken of a positive number; p is the vector of prices of the variable outputs; vπi, represents random
error; and uπi represents inefficiency that reduces profits.  Similar to cost inefficiency, profit inefficiency
is defined as that amount of profit that is not being earned compared to the predicted maximum profit that
could be earned if the firm was as efficient as the best-practice firm.  Thus, it is the percentage of profits
that is left on the table, so to speak.
As discussed in Berger and Mester (1997), profit efficiency is a more comprehensive measure of
performance than is cost efficiency, since it accounts for errors on the output side as well as those on the
                                                     
2 To see this, note that, ignoring random error, ui = ln Ci – ln f(yi, wi, zi, hi).7
input side.  It is based on the economic goal of profit maximization, which requires that the same amount
of managerial attention be paid to raising a marginal dollar of revenue as to reducing a marginal dollar of
costs.  That is, a firm that spends $1 additional to raise revenues by $2, all else held equal, would
appropriately be measured as being more profit efficient but might inappropriately be measured as being
less cost efficient.  Note that cost efficiency evaluates performance holding output constant at its current
level, which generally will not correspond to an optimum.  A firm that is relatively cost efficient at its
current output may or may not be cost efficient at its optimal output, which typically involves a different
scale and mix of outputs.  Standard profit efficiency embodies the cost inefficiency deviations from the
optimal point, as well as revenue inefficiencies.
3
2.3 More Complicated Objectives. As we discussed earlier, the standard concepts of cost
minimization or profit maximization may not be the only goals being pursued by the firms’ managers and
some studies have incorporated more complicated objectives.
The goals of cost minimization and profit maximization may not be general enough.  Explicitly
recognizing the tradeoff between return and risk, where risk is a choice variable of the firm, would seem
to be an important consideration for financial institutions (see Hughes, 1999, and Hughes, Lang, Mester,
and Moon, 2000, and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001).  For example, an increase in a bank’s scale of
operations may allow it to reduce its exposure to both credit and liquidity risk through diversification.  All
else equal, this could mean scale economies in risk management costs.  But all else is not equal: by
reducing the risk attached to any given production plan, better diversification can decrease the marginal
cost of risk-taking and lead banks to take on more risk to earn a greater return.  Not accounting for risk
when specifying the production structure can obscure scale economies, since additional risk-taking is
costly in terms of the additional resources needed to manage the risk and the higher risk premium that has
                                                     
3 Berger and Mester (1997) discuss another type of profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency.  This concept is
based on estimates of the alternative profit function, which substitutes output levels for output prices in the
specification of the profit function.  This function is estimated to provide additional information when the
maintained assumptions underlying the standard profit function do not hold.  It may provide useful information if
there are unmeasured differences in output qualities across firms; outputs are not completely variable; output
markets are not perfectly competitive; or output prices are not accurately measured.8
to be paid to attract uninsured funding.  (Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001, show that accounting for risk
can uncover substantial scale economies at U.S. commercial banks.)  When exposure to risk is influenced
by production decisions, then cost minimization and profit maximization need not coincide to value
maximization.  Estimates of efficiency that are derived from cost and profit functions may be
mismeasured, since they do not penalize suboptimal choices of risk and quality that then affect prices.
If firms take risk as well as profit into account when making production decisions, then the model
of production that one evaluates efficiency against would need to include this.  Hughes, Lang, Mester,
Moon (2000) construct a model of firm production that incorporates the risk-return tradeoff.  Managers’
most preferred production plan maximizes a utility function that accounts for how the probability
distribution of profit depends on the production plan.  Duality theory is used to derive the most preferred
input and profit demand equations.  These demand functions are those that maximize the managers’ utility
function.
Hughes, Mester, Moon (2001) develop measures of efficiency based on the expected return-risk
tradeoff implied by the production model.  ER is the firm’s predicted profit, as calculated from the
estimated profit-share equation from the model, divided by the firm’s equity level.  RK is the standard
error of predicted profit divided by equity.  The authors show that ER and RK are systematically related
to the market value of equity for the subsample of publicly traded banks, so they can be used to derive
market return efficiency measures.  A risk-return frontier is then estimated:
ERi = Г0 + Г1 RKi + Г2 RKi
2 + vi  − ui, (3)
where vi  is a two-sided error term representing random error, and ui is a one-sided error term representing
inefficiency.  An inefficiency measure based on this frontier would give the increase in expected return
that would occur if the firm moved to the frontier, holding risk constant.  That is, it identifies lost
potential return given the firm’s level of return risk. One can identify the group of banks that are most9
efficient (say, the quarter of banks with the lowest levels of measured inefficiency) as those that are
value-maximizing banks.
4
Note that even with more complicated objectives, the efficient frontier takes on a general form
(see Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, 2000).  If Xi denotes a measure of the financial performance of firm i,
e.g., profit, or the market value of its assets, and Gi denotes a measure defining the peer group used to
compare firm i's financial performance, e.g., risk or the replacement cost of assets, the general form of the
frontier, which gives the highest potential value of Xi given Gi is:
Xi  =  α0 + α1 Gi + α2 (Gi )
2 +  vi  −  ui,
where vi is a two-sided random error term with zero mean, and ui is a one-sided error term representing
inefficiency.  (Note that more flexible function forms than the quadratic could be specified.) For example,
financial performance, X, might be measured by predicted profit from an estimated model and G might be
measured by risk, e.g., the firm's interest-rate beta, or by size, e.g., its equity or asset level.  Note that for
any G, the optimality of the choice of G is not taken into account when measuring efficiency.  That is, if
G is risk, then a firm's performance would be compared only to those taking on the same level of risk.
The firm would not be penalized for a nonoptimal choice of risk that lowered performance.
3. Efficiency Measurement Methods
Even after the appropriate concept or goal against which efficiency is to be evaluated is chosen,
certain issues need to be confronted before the estimates can be obtained.  These include estimation
technique; specification of the functional form of the frontier; variables to include in the frontier; and data
measurement issues.
                                                     
4 Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996) present two other efficiency measures: a measure of the decrease in risk
that would occur if the firm moved to the frontier along the ray orthogonal to the frontier relative to risk at the
frontier (the orthogonal ray is the shortest path to the frontier); a measure of the increase in expected return that
would occur if the firm moved to the frontier on the ray orthogonal to the frontier relative to expected return at the
frontier.  These measures cannot account for random error’s effect on the placement of the bank relative to the
frontier.
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) present an additional two efficiency measures.  For publicly traded bank
holding companies they derive an efficiency measure based on estimating a frontier that relates the market value of
assets to the book value of assets, and they derive another efficiency measure based on estimating a frontier that
relates the market value of equity to the book value of equity.  These measures indicate the bank holding company’s
lost potential market value of equity or assets based on the book value of equity or assets, respectively.10
3.1 Estimation Techniques.  Here we’ll discuss the methods used for estimating frontiers (i.e.,
identifying the inefficiency component from the random noise component in frontier estimation).
Common frontier efficiency estimation techniques are data envelopment analysis (DEA), free
disposable hull analysis (FDH), the stochastic frontier approach, the thick frontier approach, and the
distribution-free approach.  The first two of these are nonparametric techniques, and the latter three are
parametric methods.
My preference is for the parametric techniques. The nonparametric methods generally ignore
prices and can, therefore, account only for technical inefficiency in using too many inputs or producing
too few outputs (as discussed above).  Another drawback is that they usually do not allow for random
error in the data, assuming away measurement error and luck as factors affecting outcomes (although
some progress is being made in this regard by using bootstrapping methods).  In effect, they disentangle
efficiency differences from random error by assuming that random error is zero!  To see the effect of
measurement error, consider Figure 3.  Firm C’s reported data imply that it is not on the frontier, and that
Firm B is more efficient than Firm C.  But its data are measured with error.  Once measurement error is
taken into account, Bank C is actually more efficient than Bank B.
In the parametric methods, a bank is labeled inefficient if it is behaving less optimally with
respect to the specified goal  e.g., costs are higher or profits are lower  than the frontier value.  The
estimation methods differ in the way ui is disentangled from the composite error term ui + vi.
In the stochastic frontier approach, the inefficiency and random error components of the
composite error term are disentangled by making explicit assumptions about their distributions.  The
random error term, vi, is assumed to be two-sided (usually normally distributed), and the inefficiency
term, ui, is assumed to be one-sided (usually half-normally distributed).  The parameters of the two
distributions are estimated and can be used to obtain estimates of firm-specific inefficiency.  The
estimated mean of the conditional distribution of ui given ui + vi, i.e.,  ii i i ˆ ˆ u E(u  (u +v ))   is usually used
to measure inefficiency.11
The distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier approach are fairly arbitrary, and
sometimes the residuals are not skewed in the direction predicted by the assumptions of the stochastic
frontier approach.
If panel data are available, some of these maintained distributional assumptions can be relaxed,
and the distribution-free approach may be used.  This method assumes that there is a core efficiency or
average efficiency for each firm over time.  The core inefficiency is distinguished from random error
(including any temporary fluctuations in inefficiency) by assuming that core inefficiency is persistent
over time, while random errors tend to average out over time.  In particular, a cost or profit function is
estimated for each period of a panel data set.  The residual in each separate regression is composed of
both inefficiency, ui, and random error, vi, but the random component, vi, is assumed to average out over
time, so that an estimate of the inefficiency term, u ˆ  ≡ the average of a firm’s residuals from all of the
regressions = average (ui+vi) = average (ui).
5  The reasonableness of the maintained assumptions about the
error term components depends on the length of period studied.  If too short a period is chosen, the
random errors might not average out, in which case random error would be attributed to inefficiency
(although truncation can help).  If too long a period is chosen, the firm’s core efficiency becomes less
meaningful because of changes in management and other events, i.e., it might not be constant over the
time period.
3.2 Functional Form, Variable Selection, and Variable Measurement.  The next step in the
parametric estimation methods is choice of functional form for the frontier, including variable selection
and measurement.  The most popular form in the literature for cost and profit functions is the translog.
The Fourier-flexible functional form augments the translog by including Fourier trigonometric terms,
which makes it more flexible than the translog.  Berger and Mester (1997) found that there was only a
small difference in average efficiency and very little difference in efficiency dispersion or rank between
cost or profit efficiency estimates based on the translog functional form and those based on the Fourier-12
flexible functional form.  While formal statistical tests indicated that the coefficients on the Fourier terms
were jointly significant at the 1-percent level, the average improvement in goodness of fit was small and
was not significant from an economic point of view.
Once the objective and functional form are selected, the next decision is the variables to include
in the function and proxies for those variables.  Ideally, the frontier to be estimated should be derived
from first principles.  For example, if the objective is cost minimization, the cost function should be
derived based on the specified production technology.  Variables to include in the cost function would be
those indicated by the theory of duality  output levels, input prices, netputs (factors that the firm cannot
vary over the shortrun, which are measured in levels), and environmental variables (to account for
differences across the firms' environments or markets, which may affect performance but are not a choice
for firm management).  For example, Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (2000) derive the profit and input
demand functions by applying Shephards Lemma to the managerial expenditure function, which is dual
to the managerial utility maximization problem, in which managers trade off risk and return.  These
equations include revenue terms, the tax rate, and risk terms, which would not be included in the
functions were the managers maximizing.  Hence, the coefficients on these terms offer a test of profit
maximization vs. utility maximization.
6  Other models would lead to other specifications.
In any of the estimation techniques, X-efficiency is essentially the residual.  This means that
omitted variables (or extraneous variables) can have large effects on measured efficiency.  Specification
of included variables is important, since the methodology depends on comparing the firm's
cost/profit/other outcome to those of a best-practice firm operating at the same level of the exogenous
variables included in the frontier.  That is, the exogenous variables determine the reference set for the
firm whose efficiency is being measured.  If something extraneous is included in the frontier
specification, then we may mislabel a firm as efficient because we would not be comparing the firm to the
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 For banks with very low or very high u ˆ , an adjustment (called truncation) is made to assign less extreme values of
u ˆ  to these banks, since extreme values may indicate that random error, vi , has not been completely purged by
averaging.13
entire set of relevant firms.  For example, if two firms differ only in that one's CEO is blond and one is a
brunette  which I'm assuming is unrelated to efficiency!  then we would want to compare their costs to
one another.  If we included CEO hair color in the cost function as a dummy variable, we would preclude
such a comparison.  We might want to include in the specification of the frontier variables that account
for differences in the environment in which the firm operates that are exogenous to the firm's decision-
making but that may affect performance, e.g., we might want to include variables that account for
demand, like income growth in the firm's market, or whether the firm is located in an urban or rural
market.  Then in measuring efficiency, the urban firms would be compared to other urban firms and the
rural firms to rural firms.  But note that the manager's potentially inefficient choice of where to set up
shop  in a rural or an urban market  would not be penalized.  The alternative is to leave the variable
out of the frontier specification, but then determine whether the efficiency estimates are correlated with
the variable.   One has to use one's judgment about what is the better way to proceed.
3.3 Special Issues in Banking.  Judgment also has to be used when applying efficiency
techniques to certain industries.  The special issues that arise in applying the techniques to the banking
industry are suggestive of some of the problems/issues that can arise in efficiency estimation.  In banking,
a big issue has been how to measure outputs and inputs. There has been some disagreement in the
literature over what a commercial bank is actually producing.  Two general approaches have been taken:
the “production” approach and the “intermediation” approach (also called the “asset” approach).  The
production approach focuses on the bank's operating costs, i.e., the costs of labor (employees) and
physical capital (plant and equipment).  The bank's outputs are measured by the number of each type of
account, like commercial and industrial loans, mortgages, deposits, etc. because it is thought that most of
the operating costs are incurred by processing account documents and debiting and crediting accounts;
inputs are labor and physical capital.  The “intermediation” approach considers a financial firm's production
process to be one of financial intermediation, i.e., the borrowing of funds and the subsequent lending of
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (2000) reject the hypothesis of profit maximization using 1989-1990 data on
U.S. banks that reported at least $1 billion in assets as of the last quarter of 1998.14
those funds.  Thus, the focus is on total costs, including both interest and operating expenses.  Outputs are
measured by the dollar volume of each of the bank's different types of loans, and inputs are labor, physical
capital, deposits and other borrowed funds, and in some studies, financial capital.
7  The studies on X-
efficiency in banking have tended to use the intermediation approach.
Theoretically, to compare one firm's efficiency to another's, we would like to compare each firm's
cost of producing the same outputs.  For banks, significant characteristics of loans are their quality, which
reflects the amount of monitoring the bank does to keep the loan performing, and their riskiness.  Unless
these characteristics are controlled for, one might conclude a bank was producing in a very efficient manner
if it were spending far less to produce a given output level, but its output might be highly risky and of a
lower quality than that of another bank.  It would be wrong to say a bank was efficient if it were scrimping
on the credit evaluation needed to produce sound loans.  Thus, recent studies have included quality and
nonperforming loans in the specifications of cost and profit functions.  Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon
(2000) derive the risk-return tradeoff explicitly from a utility maximization model rather than just
augmenting the cost and profit functions with risk and quality measures.  See Hughes (1999) for further
discussion.
Unfortunately, there are likely to be unmeasured differences in quality because the banking data
do not fully capture the heterogeneity in bank output.  The amount of service flow associated with
financial products is by necessity usually assumed to be proportionate to the dollar value of the stock of
assets or liabilities on the balance sheet, which can result in significant mismeasurement.  For example,
commercial loans can vary in size, repayment schedule, risk, transparency of information, type of
                                                     
7 A slight variation on the intermediation approach, which has been used in some studies, is to distinguish between
transactions deposits, which are treated as an output, since they can serve as a measure of the amount of transactions
services the bank produces, and purchased or borrowed funds (like federal funds or large CDs purchased from another
bank), which are treated as inputs, since the bank does not produce services in obtaining these funds.  The strict
intermediation approach would consider the transactions services produced by the bank as an intermediate output,
something that must be produced along the way toward the bank's final output of earning assets.  Hughes and Mester
(1993) empirically tested whether deposits should be treated as an input or output and found support that they should be
treated as an input in their study.
Another approach that has been taken less often is the “value-added” approach, which considers all liabilities
and assets of the bank to have at least some of the characteristics of an output.  Still another approach, taken in Mester15
collateral, covenants to be enforced, etc.  These differences are likely to affect the costs to the bank of
loan origination, ongoing monitoring and control, and financing expense.  Unmeasured differences in
product quality may be incorrectly measured as differences in cost inefficiency.
Another issue raised in recent papers in the bank efficiency literature is the treatment of financial
capital.  A bank’s insolvency risk depends on its financial capital available to absorb portfolio losses, as
well as on the portfolio risks themselves.  Insolvency risk affects bank costs and profits via the risk
premium the bank has to pay for uninsured debt and through the intensity of risk management activities
the bank undertakes.  For this reason, the financial capital of the bank should be considered when
studying efficiency.  To some extent, controlling for the interest rates paid on uninsured debt helps
account for differences in risk, but these rates are imperfectly measured.
Even apart from risk, a bank's capital level directly affects costs by providing an alternative to
deposits as a funding source for loans.  Interest paid on debt counts as a cost, but dividends paid do not.
On the other hand, raising equity typically involves higher costs than raising deposits.  If the first effect
dominates, measured costs will be higher for banks using a higher proportion of debt financing; if the
second effect dominates, measured costs will be lower for these banks.  Large banks depend more on debt
financing to finance their portfolios than small banks do, so a failure to control for equity could yield a
scale bias.
Studies that have considered financial capital include the level of capital rather than its price.
Including the price assumes that banks on the frontier are selecting the cost-minimizing level of capital.
This might not be the case because of regulations that set a minimum capital-to-asset ratio or because of
risk-aversion on the part of bank managers.  See Hughes and Mester (1993) for further discussion.
3.4 Tests of Expense-Preference Behavior.  The sections above give an overview of efficiency
measurements.  Expense-preference is one particular form of X-inefficiency, in which firm managers are
assumed to derive utility from choosing a greater than efficient (i.e., cost-minimizing or profit-
                                                                                                                                                                          
(1992), is to consider the bank's output to be its loan origination and loan monitoring services, since these outputs are
more closely related to the theory of financial intermediation.16
maximizing) level of one or more of the firm's inputs, usually labor.  That is, the managerial utility
function is U=U(π, E), where E represents expenditures on the input.
Tests for expense preference are based on estimating input demand functions or cost functions.
The functional forms are derived explicitly from the utility function, which depend on the underlying
production function of the firm.  Edwards (1977) derived the demand for labor equation for a firm using a
Cobb-Douglas production function and exhibiting expense preference for labor.  Mester (1989b)
generalizes expense-preference tests to allow for less restrictive production structures and the presence of
expense-preference toward any input, not just labor.  Note that the derived tests in both of these studies
cannot give firm-specific measures of inefficiency.  Rather they are tests of whether a group of firms is
showing expense-preference toward any input.  Issues of functional form choice, variable choice, and
variable measurement discussed above are as relevant in these tests as they are in measuring more general
X-inefficiency.
4. Application of Efficiency Measurement Techniques to Central Banks
The review above discusses some of the steps that need to be followed in implementing
efficiency measurement.  The main steps involve choosing the:
(1) Efficiency concept, i.e., firm objective function (this includes specification of the production
function of the firm),
(2) Estimation technique,
(3) Functional form,
(4) Variables and their proxies.
Can this process be applied to the central bank?  There are some (narrow) aspects of central
banking to which efficiency measurement can be applied.  Other aspects of central banking would be
more difficult to study with efficiency measurement techniques.  If we are interested in the narrow case of
whether the central bank is creating its “output” in the most efficient manner in the sense of resource
costs, then there are certain outputs where we can apply the standard efficiency measurement techniques.
The key is being able to define that output and to specify the central bank's objective function with17
respect to that output.  Once that is done, the rest of the process is fairly straightforward, although one is
likely to confront measurement and data issues (which could be serious).  For other bank activities, this
would be difficult because measuring the central bank's output is difficult.  Moreover, if we are interested
in social efficiency, i.e., is the central bank operating to minimize the costs borne by society for a given
level of “output,” that is a more difficult question than the question of resource costs.
In the U.S., central bank activities include monetary policy, bank supervision and regulation, and
payment services, to ensure financial system stability and maximum sustainable economic growth.  Of
these “products,” efficiency measurement techniques can most easily be applied to the question of
resource cost efficiency of providing payment services, given that the central bank is a provider of the
services.
8
4.1 Application to Payment Services.  The Fed's payment services include check clearing and
collection, wire transfers, automated clearinghouse transfers, securities safekeeping, and coin and
currency distribution.  To the extent that the Fed is mandated to provide some of these services on a
competitive basis, it would seem reasonable to assume that the Fed would want to minimize its costs of
producing these services, subject to the constraints under which is must operate (e.g, given the areas it is
required to service, particular inputs it is required to use, quality of output it is required to provide) and
given the choice of production technology (one that does not subject the payment system to excessive
risk).   An efficient Fed would likely want to minimize its costs of production even for the payments
services over which it has a monopoly, e.g., currency distribution, although in this case there would be no
competitive forces driving the Fed toward cost minimization.  Thus, in the case of payment services, the
goal could be specified  minimize the cost of producing the payment service  and the output of the
payment service could be measured  e.g., number of checks processed, number of pieces of unfit
currency destroyed.  So the efficiency measurement techniques could be applied.  (There are many issues
that would come up in implementing the techniques, e.g., whether the central bank wants to minimize
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costs each year, or over a longer period, but these types of problems come up in any efficiency study and
are not unique to applications to central banking.)
Several papers have estimated cost functions for central bank payment services and estimated
scale economies based on the estimated cost function.  Fewer papers have applied efficiency
measurement techniques to central bank payment services (see, e.g., Bauer and Ferrier, 1996; Bauer and
Hancock, 1993; Bohn, Hancock, and Bauer, 2001; and Gilbert, Wheelock, and Wilson, 2002).  But these
papers show it can be done, under the assumption that the Fed wants to minimize costs of production.  As
an example consider Bohn, Hancock, and Bauer (2001).  They estimate cost functions for Fed currency
operations, where the outputs are number of fit notes generated by high-speed currency processing
operations; number of notes destroyed either on-line by the high-speed machines or off-line at the
reconciliation stations; and total number of transactions with depository institutions (which is number of
incoming shipments of currency received + number of outgoing orders for currency filled).  Inputs
specified are buildings, labor, equipment, and materials, with equipment or equipment and buildings
entered as levels (netputs) in some specifications.  The translog and a hybrid of the translog cost function
are estimated and the stochastic frontier and distribution-free methods are used to derive cost efficiency
measures for the 37 Federal Reserve Banks and Branches that do currency operations.  They find that the
average office operates at more than 80 percent of the efficiency of the best-practice office.   Although the
cost-efficiency estimates for individual offices vary substantially across the estimated models, there is a
consistent grouping for the most efficient and least efficient offices across models.  Thus, the study shows
that one can apply the standard techniques and get seemingly reasonable estimates of efficiency for a
central bank business.
But the discussion above assumed that the choice of technology used in the production of
payment services was given.  That is, once the technology is chosen, the central bank would want to
provide services in the most efficient manner.  In choosing the technology with which it provides the
service, however, the central bank may have other goals in addition to efficient production.  To the extent
that the central bank wants to ensure stability of the payment system, it may choose or design a19
technology or type of payment service that is not least-cost if that means lower risk with regard to
stability.  This is similar to the tradeoff facing bank managers with regards to their choice of loan quality
that Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996 and 2000) study.  Berger, Hancock, and Marquardt (1996)
discuss this tradeoff and the risk in different forms of payment.  The main risk is settlement risk, which
includes both credit risk and liquidity risk, and which can develop into systemic problems if the problems
of one participant spill over onto others.
There is also the issue of whether the central bank should be providing payment services or
whether it should leave the provision to the private sector.  Gilbert (1998) studies whether the creation of
the Fed and its provision of check-collection services improved the efficiency of the U.S. payments
system.  He argues that the Fed's service lowered transactions cost of making payments and that banks
found the Fed's system for collecting checks across regions more attractive than the old system.  Standard
efficiency techniques used to investigate resource costs in payments would not capture the social
efficiency of technologies and products.
4.2 Application to Banking Supervision and Financial Stability.  It is more problematic to
apply the efficiency techniques to either banking supervision or monetary policy.  The reason is that it is
difficult to specify the relevant objective function with respect to these activities.  Unless one can clearly
specify the objective function, then it is difficult to proceed.   I do not know of any papers that have
applied the standard methods of efficiency measurement to banking supervision, which is located in some
central banks as well as the bank supervisory agencies.  The goal of financial market stability is a worthy
one, but how do we measure it?  One can conceptualize the question of whether the central bank
efficiently deploys its bank examiners in a way to achieve the highest level of banking industry
soundness.  But taking that question to data is difficult because it is difficult to quantify the output.  It
would have to be more than just counting the number of banks examined and relating that to the cost of
the bank supervisory staff.  One could relate the number of bank failures over a certain period with the
number/cost of supervisory staff involved in examining the banks during the prior period and estimate a
frontier across different regulators or over time (holding constant other factors related to failure).  But20
does a high failure rate mean poor supervision?  Is a bank failure a failure of the supervisory process,
since the examination process didn't identify the problem in the bank early enough to get management to
fix it, or is a bank failure (that doesn't spread) a success because it weeds out bad management?
9
4.3 Application to Monetary Policy.  Similar issues surround the use of the efficiency
estimation techniques with regard to monetary policy.  Even a narrow application just looking at resource
efficiency still requires being able to write down the objective function of the monetary policymaker,
measuring the "outputs" and "inputs" of policy.  And resource allocation does not seem to be the
interesting question regarding monetary policy efficiency.  Cosier and Longworth  (2003) present a good
overview of the Bank of Canada's approach to assessing the efficiency of monetary policy.
Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act lays out the Fed's monetary policy objectives: “The Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long
run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and
moderate long-term interest rates.”  Thus, the Fed is to conduct monetary policy to promote price
stability, sustainable growth, and financial stability.  Translating this into a well-specified objective
function to which efficiency measurement techniques can be applied is difficult, partly because the
parameters of any loss function are not known and may differ across policymakers.
Here I’ll describe two different applications of efficiency techniques to monetary policy activites.
4.3.1 Expense-Preference Behavior of Central Banks.  Only a handful of papers have looked at
the X-efficiency of the monetary policy function at central banks.  These papers have investigated
expense-preference behavior at the Fed and include Toma (1982), Shughart and Tollison (1983a), Boyes,
Mounts, and Sowell (1988), and Mester (1994).  Boyes, Mounts, and Sowell (1988) define the Fed’s
                                                     
9 Note that one can compare the efficiency (cost or profit) of banks examined by the Fed, OCC, and FDIC, holding
other traits of the bank constant, as perhaps an indirect measure of supervisory effectiveness.  The supervisor, like
the market, exerts some control over the bank.  But this would not tell one whether the supervisor was efficiently
exerting that control. Berger and Mester (1997) found only weak relationships between regulator identity and cost
and profit efficiency.21
output as the monetary base (reserves + currency outside the banking system), assume the Fed has a
Cobb-Douglas production function, and investigate whether the Fed exhibits expense preference toward
labor (at the Board and Reserve Banks) by estimating the derived input demand function assuming that
the Fed’s goal is to maximize profits with regard to money creation.  They find evidence of expense
preference.  Mester (1994) expands the model and tests, showing that one of the maintained assumptions
underlying Boyes, Mounts, and Sowell  that the Fed uses a Cobb-Douglas technology  is rejected by
the data.  More general tests of expense preference that allow a less restrictive production technology for
the Fed cannot reject the hypothesis that the Fed did not indulge in expense preference toward labor.
In the Boyes, Mounts, and Sowell model the Fed uses a Cobb-Douglas production function to
create the money supply, then Mt = AL1t
bL2t
cK1t
d K2t
e where Mt = monetary base, L1t is the number of
employees at the Board of Governors, L2t is the number of employees at the Federal Reserve Banks, K1t is
physical capital at the Board of Governors, and K2t is physical capital at the Reserve Banks.
10  The
demand for money function facing the Fed is Rt = j0Mt
j1Y1t
j2 Y2t
j3, where Rt is the appropriate interest rate,
Y1t is real GDP, and Y2t is the currency-to-deposit ratio.  Y1t and Y2t are shift variables representing all
nonprice factors affecting demand.  To the extent that the Fed also produces check-processing services, in
addition to the monetary base, and the volume of such processing is related to the level of real GDP and
currency-to-deposits, these variables might also proxy other outputs.
Mester (1994) shows that if Fed managers act to maximize profits, π = RM – W1L1 − W2L2 − r1K1
− r2K2, (i.e., they do not exhibit expense preference), then the implied demand functions for labor are:
ln L1t = a0  + a1 ln W1t + a2 ln W2t + a3 ln r1t + a4 ln r2t + a5 Y1t + a6Y2t (4)
ln L2t = b0  + b1 ln W1t + b2 ln W2t + b3 ln r1t + b4 ln r2t  + b5Y1t + b6Y2t,( 5 )
where W1t = wage of labor at the Board of Governors, W2t = wage of labor at the Federal Reserve Banks,
r1t = cost of capital at the Board of Governors, and r2t = cost of capital at the Reserve Banks.
                                                     
10 Actually, Boyes, Mount, and Sowell ignore physical capital; the Mester extension considers it.22
If, on the other hand, the Fed exhibits expense preference for labor by maximizing a utility
function of the form U=U(πt,E1t,E2t), where πt = System profits, E1t = expenditures for Board labor, and
E2t = expenditures for Reserve Bank labor, then the labor demand functions are:
ln L1t =   α0  + α1 ln W1t + α1 ln(1−(UE1/Uπ))t +  α2 ln W2t + α2 ln(1−(UE2/Uπ))t
+ α3 ln r1t + α4 ln r2t + α5Y1t + α6Y2t (6)
ln L2t =   β0  + β1 ln W1t + β1 ln(1−(UE1/Uπ))t +  β2 ln W2t + β2 ln(1−(UE2/Uπ))t
+ β3 ln r1t + β4 ln r2t  + β5Y1t + β6Y2t,( 7 )
where UE1 = marginal utility of expenditures on Board staff, UE2  = marginal utility of expenditures on
Reserve Banks’ staff, and Uπ = marginal utility of profits.
11
Proxying the expense preference term ln(1−(UE1/Uπ))t by ln [(Board assessments/number of
Board employees)/System profits] ≡ ln p1t − ln L1t, and the expense preference term ln(1−(UE2/Uπ))t by
ln [(Federal Reserve Bank expenses/number of Reserve Bank employees)/System profits] ≡ ln p2t − ln L2t,
the reduced form of the labor demand functions (6) and (7) are:
ln L1t =   A0  + A1 ln W1t + A1 ln p1t + A2 ln W2t + A2 ln p2t
+ A3 ln r1t + A4 ln r2t + A5Y1t + A6Y2t (8)
ln L2t =   B0  + B1 ln W1t + B1 ln p1t +  B2 ln W2t + B2 ln p2t
+ B3 ln r1t + B4 ln r2t  + B5Y1t + B6Y2t,( 9 )
with the appropriate coefficient definitions and where p1t = Board assessments/System profits, and ln p2t −
ln L2t, where p2t = Reserve Bank expenses/System profits.
A joint test of Cobb-Douglas production technology and expense-preference behavior involves
estimating the system without coefficient restrictions and then testing whether the coefficient on ln W1t =
coefficient on ln p1t, the coefficient on ln W2t = coefficient on ln p2t in each input demand function, the
coefficient on ln W1t < 0 in the Board demand function, and the coefficient on ln W2t < 0 in the Reserve
                                                     
11 Boyes, Mount, and Sowell’s labor demand functions differ from these for unexplained reasons.  The demand for
Board labor excludes the term α2 ln W2t and the restriction of equal coefficients on ln W1t and ln (1−(UE1/Uπ)) was
not imposed.  And similarly for the Reserve Bank labor demand equation.23
Bank demand function.  Mester rejects the joint hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas technology and expense
preference based on these tests.
Mester (1994) then generalizes the tests to allow for a more general production technology than
Cobb-Douglas and to allow for the possibility that the Fed shows expense preference toward physical
capital instead of or together with labor.  Assuming that the Fed’s underlying cost function  i.e., the cost
function it would have if it did not exhibit expense preference  is of the translog form, she derives the
log cost function and log input expenditure functions were the Fed to exhibit expense preference.  This is
a nonlinear model and yields coefficient tests for expense preference.  Again, the tests reject expense
preference on the part of the Fed.
These expense-preference tests show that standard efficiency techniques can be applied to
monetary policy activities.  However, the tests are based upon a model where an efficient Fed maximizes
profits.  It is not clear that profit maximization is the correct metric for the central bank’s money supply
activities.
4.3.2 Other Objective Functions.  There is a long literature that looks at monetary policy
reaction functions, or Taylor-type rules for monetary policy (see Taylor, 1999, for a survey and Hetzel,
2000, for a critique of the Taylor-rule literature).  Such a rule relates the policy instrument to targets for
inflation and output gap or the unemployment rate, i.e., it relates the instrument to macroeconomic
variables.  It also assumes that the economic dynamics imply a tradeoff between inflation and the output
gap or unemployment (i.e., it is based on an underlying Philips curve).  For example,
ft = r* + πt + θπ (πt − π*) + θy yt, (10)
where ft is the nominal interest rate, πt is inflation, yt  is the output gap (the percentage deviation of output
from potential output), π* is the policymaker’s inflation target, and r* is the long-run equilibrium or
“natural” real rate of interest.  (Sometimes the rule is written so that the output gap is replaced by the
difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment, ut − u*.)  Taylor’s
original specification had π* = 2, r* = 2, θπ =1/2, and θy = 1/2.  According to Orphanides (1998) and
Taylor (1999), Taylor’s rule appears to perform well in a variety of models and appears to be robust to24
model specification.  However, the original Taylor rule specification is not necessarily “efficient” in the
sense of stabilizing output and inflation at their targets.  That is, there are alternative values of the
coefficients that yield better performance.   In addition, the rules are hard to implement as written, since
the policymaker does not have accurate information on the current values of inflation or the output gap
when setting the interest rate.  Both inflation and the output gap are estimated with considerable noise.
Such a rule can be derived from a model of the economy in which the central bank’s goal is to
stabilize output and inflation.  Let inflation be determined by
πt = πt−1 + αyt + et, (11)
where α > 0 and et is the disturbance to inflation, which captures supply shocks.
Let output be determined by
yt =  ρyt−1 − ξ(rt−1 − r*) + ut, (12)
where ξ > 0, 0<ρ<1, and ut is the disturbance to output, which captures demand shocks.
Let the central bank’s objective function be to minimize a weighted sum of the unconditional
variances of inflation and the output gap,
minimize L = ωVar(πt − πt*) + (1−ω)Var(yt), 0<ω<1. (13)
Orphanides (1998) shows that given the processes for output and inflation, in the absence of
noise, the optimal policy relative to this objective function is
ft = r* + πt + θπ
N (πt − π*) + θy
N yt, (14)
where 
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Given this model, one can trace out the inflation-output gap variance frontier as a function of ω, the
weight on inflation in policymaker’s loss function.  That is, for a given ω, if the policymaker follows the
optimal policy, it produces a particular inflation variance and output gap variance.  Each ω yields a single
point on the frontier. The frontier gives the values of the variance of inflation and the variance of the
output gap as ω varies between 0 and 1.  See Figure 4.  An efficient policy will be one that places us on25
the frontier  which point on the frontier depends on the policymaker’s loss function, i.e., his/her
preferences for inflation and output stability.
12
One can then examine where actual experience has been relative to this frontier.  If we knew the
weight, ω, in the policymaker’s loss function, then we would want to compare the actual point to the point
on the frontier corresponding to ω.  Inefficiency could be measured as the distance to this point, but this
would weight the deviation of actual inflation variability from optimal inflation variability and the
deviation of actual output variability from optimal output variability equally.  Instead, it might make
sense to measure inefficiency using the weights in the loss function, i.e.,
     Inefficiency  =            ω [Actual inflation variability − Optimal inflation variability given ω]
     + (1−ω)[Actual output variability − Optimal output variability given ω]. (16)
This essentially uses the policymaker’s loss function to weight the deviations of actual output gap
and inflation variance from optimal variances.  However, in general, we will not know the policymaker’s
loss function parameter, so we will not know which point on the frontier is the proper reference point as
the optimal point.  There are several different measures of distance from the frontier that could be used to
measure inefficiency  horizontal distance, which would measure the increase in inflation variance for a
given level of output gap variance; vertical distance, which would measure the increase in output variance
for a given level of inflation variance; the minimum distance to the frontier (which is the distance to the
frontier along a ray orthogonal to the frontier); and the distance to the frontier along a ray through the
origin.
Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2001), and Cecchetti and Krause (2002) studied central
bank efficiency across different countries using this type of efficiency frontier.  They estimated a two-
equation model of the economy, similar to the model described above, for 24 countries using data from
1991Q1 to 1998Q4, and trace out an efficient frontier for each country.  They assume that the inflation
target is 2 percent for all countries.  Their output measure is industrial production and they use trend
growth in industrial production as a measure of potential growth.  Then, for a given ω, they measure the
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loss associated with actual performance of the country using the loss function in equation (13).  Part of
this loss is due to inefficiency, the fact that the actual performance point is interior to the frontier.  They
measure the inefficiency of actual performance relative to optimal performance using equation (16).  To
determine each country's ω they use the ω that corresponds to the point at the intersection of the frontier
and a ray through the origin and the point of actual performance.   The optimal values of inflation
variability and output variability are those on the frontier at this intersection.  The authors find that there
is high variation in both performance and policy efficiency across countries.  They also find that central
bank credibility  the difference between the policymaker's plans regarding inflation and the public's
belief about those plans  is the main factor from among central bank independence, transparency,
accountability, and credibility that explains most of the cross-country variation in macroeconomic
outcomes. Independence, transparency, and accountability explain little of the variation.  The authors are
able to look at the shift in each country's efficient frontier over time by estimating the models over two
different time periods.  Thus, they have estimates of both "technological change" and changes in
efficiency (i.e., changes in the dispersion from the frontier) over time.
13
The work of Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2001) and Cecchetti and Krause (2002) is an
example of an application of the ideas from the efficiency literature to monetary policy.  But the actual
implementation is tricky because it depends on a number of embedded assumptions.  The efficiency
measures are based on a particular value of ω, but the policymaker’s ω is not known.  The authors choose
a value based upon the location of actual performance.
14   The policymaker's inflation and potential
growth targets, which are important components of the objective function, are not necessarily explicitly
stated by the central bank.  One has to believe the economy’s dynamics imply a tradeoff between inflation
                                                                                                                                                                          
that issue aside.
13 Berger and Mester (2002) develop a framework for decomposing changes in bank performance into three
components: change in the best-practice technology, change in efficiency or dispersion from best practice, and
change in business conditions or economic factors exogenous to the firm.  The first two components  change in
best practice and changes in inefficiency  together form the more traditional notion of change in productivity.
14 Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) provide a methodology for estimating ω for a country based on the slope of the
country's aggregate supply curve and the variances of output and inflation, and assuming policymakers are acting
efficiently, i.e., they are on the frontier.  They find that for most of the 23 countries they study, ω, is quite large over27
and the output gap.  And nontrivial choices have to be made about how to measure inflation and the
output gap (which inflation measure, which indicator of output, time period, etc.)  Moreover, if policy is
efficient given the policymaker’s ω, it could still be inefficient from society’s viewpoint.  (E.g., putting no
weight on inflation variability would likely lead to very poor economic outcomes.  This is saying that the
loss function of policymakers and the loss function of society may differ.)  In addition, even if ω were
known, there are significant measurement problems with implementing these efficiency estimates.
Orphanides (1998) shows how the frontier shifts if the policymaker takes into account measurement error
in the data, which, of course, will change the measures of inefficiency.
A key insight from the efficiency measurement literature is that you would also want to explicitly
recognize that at the time of evaluation, the data on inflation and output are measured with error.  That is,
there are differences in the real-time data that are available when the policymaker has to make his/her
decisions and the ultimate values of these variables.  Thus, one would want to account for this kind of
measurement error when evaluating efficiency frontier.  Using data on revisions to inflation and output
gap measures, one can derive confidence intervals around the estimates of actual inflation and output gap
variability.  And then measure inefficiency based on the distance from the edge of the confidence
boundary to the confidence interval around the frontier  see Figure 5.
5. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the standard techniques of efficiency measurement, discussed some of
the issues that arise in applying these standard techniques to central banks, and reviewed some of the
literature that has attempted to apply these techniques to central banking.  The uniqueness of some of the
activities of central banking, the difficulty in measuring some of the central banking outputs, and the
complicated and multiple objectives pursued by central banks makes application of the standard
techniques problematic.  Certain central bank activities do lend themselves to efficiency measurement,
e.g., payment services provision.  It is much more difficult to apply the techniques to bank supervision
                                                                                                                                                                          
the 1984-97 period, with average value across countries of 0.73 (assuming an inflation target of 2 percent).  Once
one relaxes the assumption that policymakers are acting efficiently, then ω cannot be estimated from the data.28
and monetary policy; however, insights from the efficiency literature can help improve the work that has
been done to date on measuring the efficiency of central banks.29
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